Examination of Our Encounter with Truth in Works of Art according to Gadamer

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Abstract – In the current world, searching for truth is primarily identified with scientific investigation with an attempt of reaching proper knowledge and objective truth. This knowledge has to show the reality as it is. According to such knowledge we are looking for the truths expressed in judgments and statements which are in line with reality. For Hans-Georg Gadamer such approach is not sufficient. When Gadamer speaks about the truth, he doesn't mean the logical rightness of statements about reality. Gadamer believed that the perspective of modern science is insufficient for the modern man. He shows that outside of science there are also areas associated with cognition which expand human knowledge about reality and about humanity itself. Gadamer thinks about such experiences as: philosophy, art, history and tradition. What is significant is that these experiences or disciplines have had a relationship with the truth for centuries. There were important, cognitive experiences for man before he developed the rigorous scientific methods leading him to the objective truth. The point is that, in hermeneutics, Gadamer describes the truth in a way which is older than scientific one. The philosopher is looking for more basic and original dimension of truth. Gadamer's position implies that the theory and the concept of rationality associated with it are essentially something more than what is left of them in the establishment of modern science. Gadamer evokes the concept of play as a way to describe the truth in work of art. In a broader context, the notion of play depicts the human way of perceiving and understanding reality and specifies the hermeneutic concept of rationality. The conception of play is used by Gadamer to deny traditional, Cartesian dualism, which determines all cognitive experiences. The game indicates the relationship which is constantly changing and is in a constant motion. At the same time, the game presents the truth as a totality that is independent of players' consciousness and more than subjective hyper-subjective. The very notion of truth has been significantly reduced in modern scientific investigation. It was found that the truth appears only if it can be checked in accordance with applicable rules of science, in other words, in accordance with accepted scientific method. This method means that it is assumed that there is a constant opportunity to verify the research's results. Since the truth has been linked with method understood in this way the criterion of knowledge is no longer truth itself, but certainty. This means that what we know is limited to what we are able to examine and check. It also means, as the philosopher explains, that the idea of verification is only executed by imitation and repetition. In a game, what is most important is what occurs between the players: something along the lines of what is being played. In the case of the art game, it means that between the spectator and the work of art, that during this understanding process, a third, unknown element comes into being and it presents itself as something true without any scientific proof.

Keywords: (Art work, Being, Hermeneutic, scientific, Truth.)

Introduction

Following on Heidegger's exploration of the question of truth and its manifestation in the work of art this article intends to trace the development of Gadamer's hermeneutical enquiry into the fundamental philosophical question of truth. Through means of a critical appraisal of his work, we shall attempt to analyze Gadamer's contribution to the understanding of the importance of the visual and linguistic arts in facilitating the event of truth, within the human experience, which leads to a self-understanding. Gadamer develops his argument from within a less critical understanding of the metaphysical tradition than one found in Heidegger. Moreover, it will be made clear that Gadamer was led to the truth through art work by means of developing the concept of the beautiful. Finally, we intend to bring into humiliation the thinking that portrays Gadamer as a mere off-shoot of Heidegger.
Gadamer's Philosophical Hermeneutics

For Gadamer, ‘Hermeneutics is above all a practice, the art of understanding and of making something understood to someone else. It is the heart of all education that wants to teach how to philosophize’ (Gadamer, 1977). And although Gadamer was not the first to rehabilitate the practice of hermeneutics which, he acknowledges, was heretofore considered to be the preserve of theological or judicial enquiries, wherein it was employed in support of authority and tradition, his continued study in the area, throughout his extensive career, is what distinguishes Gadamer as a decisive figure in the development of twentieth-century hermeneutics.

According to Friedrich Schleiermacher, the process of understanding involves the circular movement between the whole and the parts, giving rise to the idea of the hermeneutics circle. In the same breath, Gadamer claims that the hermeneutic circle is ‘the starting point’ of his attempts to lay the foundations of hermeneutics. However, Heidegger in Being and Time argues that the phenomenology of Dasein ‘is a hermeneutics in the primordial signification where it designates this business of interpreting’, (Heidegger, 1962) which, as the interpretation of the being of an existential being, effectively constitutes an ontological hermeneutics (Heidegger, 1962). Furthermore, in Being and Time Heidegger develops Schleiermacher's circular process of understanding, interpretation and judgment which represents a departure from the Cartesian linear approach to truth (Descartes, 1983). Moreover, following Heraclitus, who first described the phenomenon of truth as uncoveredness, Heidegger makes the connection between ‘Being-true’ and ‘taking entities out of their hiddenness and letting them be seen in their unhiddenness (their uncoveredness)’ (Heidegger, 1962). The disclosive aspect of truth is central to Heidegger’s enquiry. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that Heidegger’s advice in Being and Time that to translate alētheia as ‘truth’ is to miss the pre-philosophical meaning of the word, as understood by the Greeks, whereby unhiddenness is always associated with hiddenness (Heidegger, 1999).

Gadamer explains that, for Heidegger ‘the understanding of the text remains permanently determined by the anticipatory movement of fore-understanding’ (Gadamer, 1979). However, contrary to John Locke’s theory of a tabula rasa, Gadamer is in agreement with Heidegger in considering that anticipation forms an integral part of our understanding. At the same time as Heidegger believes in the primacy of the future for the anticipation of our understanding, Gadamer believes that such anticipation can only occur with the benefit of our experience of the past.

Therefore, even as each of the thinkers approaches it from a different perspective, it can be seen that for both Gadamer and Heidegger understanding involves historical presuppositions or prejudice. It should, however, be noted that the term prejudice within this context does not necessarily have the negative connotations, which it acquired at the time of the enlightenment. As Gadamer writes:

Historical analysis shows that it is not until the enlightenment that the concept of prejudice acquires the negative aspect that we are familiar with. Actually ‘prejudice’ means a judgment that is given before all the elements that determine a situation have been finally examined, ‘prejudice’ certainly does not mean a false judgment (Gadamer, 1979).

With this observation, Gadamer indicates that understanding is always mediated from within a background of experience and that the notion of an approach to understanding, which is cognizant of prejudice, implies that it is an informed and measured approach. However, this is not to discount the possibility, which Gadamer brings to our attention, that our understanding can be affected by a subjective bias. Therefore, having informed us that hermeneutics concerns the phenomenon of understanding and of making something understood and that the hermeneutical task of understanding always involves a questioning of things, Gadamer cautions against the danger of allowing one’s preconceived ideas to obstruct the actual meaning of the text in our attempts to understand it. Borrowing Heidegger’s fore-structure terminology, he explains that it is important ‘to be aware of one’s own bias, so that the text may present itself in all its newness and thus be able to assert its own truth against one’s own fore-meanings’ (Gadamer, 1979).

Gadamer began his hermeneutical enquiry in the mid 1930’s when, as he recalls, Heidegger no longer trusted the notion of hermeneutics to keep his thinking free from the consequences of a transcendental theory of consciousnesses (Gadamer, 2007). He claims that it fell to him to confront the task of ‘speaking up for the happening that resides in understanding and also the task of overcoming modern subjectivism by an analysis of hermeneutics experience that becomes reflectively aware of itself’ (Gadamer, 2007). To this end, the hermeneutics
which Gadamer develops displays a Heideggerian influence, based upon finitude and the historical character of Dasein (Grondin, 2002).

The aim of Gadamer’s hermeneutical enquiry is, to uncover a place for what seemed important and true [in art and the humanities] in the face of the overwhelming power of the historical standpoint (Gadamer, 2007). From this observation by Richard E. Palmer, it can be seen that Gadamer intends to discard the traditional conception of art and in freeing it from the constraints of subjectivism and methodological scientific enquiry allow it to assume its rightful mythical place within human culture which in his view is also characteristic of metaphysics and religion. Gadamer’s treatment of the historical aspect of our understanding is a distinctive feature of his hermeneutics and in what could be interpreted as a response to Heidigger's claim that 'crue toward the tradition is reverence toward the past’ (Heidegger, 1997), Gadamer looks to the past and he seeks to re-establish the relevance of historical thought to contemporary times, thereby redressing what he sees as ‘the historical self-division with which historical positivism had deflated ideas into mere opinions and philosophy into doxography’ (Gadamer, 2007).

In contrast to the empiricism of historical positivism with its reliance upon logic, Gadamer appeals to an historical aspect of thinking whereby the horizons of our understanding combine, which he refers to as a ‘fusion of horizons’. An horizon, he specifies, ‘is not a rigid frontier, but something that moves with one and invites one to advance further… to have an horizon means not being limited to what is nearest, but to be able to see beyond it’ (Gadamer, 1979) and as the phrase suggests, this fusion can be understood as a blending of historical times and situations where ‘in every present moment not only is a horizon of the future opened up but also the horizon of the past is in play’ (Gadamer, 2007). This is not, however, to detract from the autonomy of the ‘present experience’ which is enjoyed by both philosophy and art and to what Gadamer, displaying an affinity to Hegel, refers to as ‘the absolute presentness of art to all times and places’ (Gadamer, 1979), but is rather an acknowledgment of the way in which art is enabled to reach out across the divides of time and enhance our understanding which, for Gadamer, always concerns our self-understanding.

On the other hand, on reflection, Gadamer questions his argument concerning temporal distance, within the context of understanding and despite its seeming persuasiveness he considers that it ‘was a poor preparation for discussing the fundamental significance of the otherness of the other and the fundamental role played by language as conversation’ (Gadamer, 1979). From this retrospective viewpoint it can be seen that, in his acknowledgment of the advantages of a view from a distance, Gadamer overlooked the importance of the discursive aspect of language, its intimacy and nearness, which is central to his hermeneutical investigation, and in attempting to redress this situation he includes the rider that ‘interpretative distance does not always have to be historical distance’ (Gadamer, 1979).

However, what does emerge from Gadamer’s original investigation in Truth and Method, with his pronouncement that ‘the true meaning of a text or a work of art is never finished; it is in fact an infinite process’ (Gadamer, 1979), is further confirmation that our understanding is never complete but rather is continuously in a state of development. Staying with Kierkegaard, Gadamer reveals that through an earlier engagement with Kierkegaard’s writings he found he was, albeit without knowing led to Hegel. Although he makes it clear that he does not count himself amongst Hegel’s followers, he reaffirms the influence which Hegel’s thought has exerted upon his own thinking, claiming that ‘it was not a matter of becoming a disciple of Hegel but rather of interiorizing the challenge that he represents for thinking’ (Gadamer, 2007). This impetus for thinking is made evident in Gadamer’s treatment of language, as Ambrosio observes, in Truth and Method ‘Gadamer profiles himself against Hegel… by highlighting different shades of meaning that emerge from the notion that “the true is the whole” when that notion is rethought from the center of language, and furthermore, he claims, “the nature of the relation between language and reality” (Ambrosia, 1987), represents the point at which Gadamer’s thinking diverges from Hegel. Whilst acknowledging Hegel’s reference to the logical aspect of grammar, Gadamer contends that within the “variety of human language structures” there lies a range of very different anticipations of what is logical’ (Gadamer, 1994).

However, what Gadamer takes from Hegel is the dialectical deductive aspect of logic with its historical implications, which he applies to the relationship between word and concept and he concludes that with words ‘there is no beginning ex nihilo. Nor is it the case that a concept could be determined as a concept without the usage of the word with all of its many meanings playing a role’ (Gadamer, 1976). And, he thereby displays the interdependency of the word and the concept (Gadamer, 1986). As Gadamer observe it, we are surrounded but not confined by language, its importance lies in its role in facilitating communication and understanding and he clarifies that ‘to make oneself understood, means to hold what is said together with an infinity of what is not said in the unity of one
meaning…’ (Gaddamer, 1979). Moreover, Gadamer notify that, ‘language gives shape to the space of our freedom’, (Gadamer, 2007). Whilst clarifying that this does not mean Hegel’s idealistic notion of freedom as the goal of world history which, in his view, is ‘utopian’. Gadamer ponders upon the legacy of Hegel, whose thought has led us to ‘encounter ourselves in art and in the challenge of religion and he states, ‘we encounter ourselves also in thinking’. Furthermore, in Gadamer’s view, the challenge represented by Hegel’s thought is not only applicable to his own thinking but also is central to Heidegger’s philosophy (Ambrosia, 1987).

Although the question of language is pivotal to the work of both of these philosophers, in what can be seen as a move away from Heidegger, Gadamer places emphasis upon the importance of language in enabling a shared dialogical enactment for the hermeneutics experience of understanding in a way that Heidegger never does. It is, nevertheless, important to note that from an early stage Heidegger stresses the importance of conversation or speech, informing us that ‘The way in which discourse gets expressed is language’ (Ambrosia, 1987).

Furthermore, in acknowledging that the ‘capacity to speak distinguishes the human being as a human being’ (Heidegger, 1983) Heidegger firmly establishes the fundamental position and relevance of language within the context of any enquiry into the question of our existential being. In Gadamer’s view, our understanding is furthered by means of conversation and dialogue involving question and answer and with his clarification that ‘one only really understands a statement when one understands it as an answer to a question’ (Gadamer, 2007), he acknowledges the primacy of the question in pursuit of knowledge. Furthermore, the posing of a question suggests that there is already a certain necessary prejudicial knowledge of the matter involved which is borne out by Gadamer’s assertion that, ‘contrary to the general opinion, it is more difficult to ask questions than to answer them’ (Gaddamer, 1979). Gadamer supports this claim by recalling Plato’s account of the difficulties encountered by the interlocutors in the Socratic dialogues, when they defensively attempt to assume the role of questioner from Socrates. This type of questioning which is only used by someone ‘to prove himself right and not to gain insight’ is, in Gadamer view, ‘false discourse’ (Gadamer, 2004), by which he places it outside the realm of what can be termed ‘conversation’, driven and guided by goodwill. Furthermore, Gadamer firmly distinguishes the practice of understanding through conversation and dialogue which he advocates, from the notion of Hegel’s dialectical method of enquiry which, because of its deductive method of reasoning, he admits to seeing as ‘a dubious compromise with the scientific thinking of modernity’ (Gadamer, 2007).

The significance of Language

The question of language, as we have ascertained, is central to Gadamer’s hermeneutical investigation. Furthermore, the relevance of language in the pursuit of knowledge is reinforced by Gadamer’s unequivocal claim that:

…reaching an understanding is a problem that must succeed or fail in the medium of language… All the phenomena involved in reaching an understanding, the phenomena of understanding and misunderstanding which constitute the central focus of what we call “hermeneutics,” clearly involve language (Gadamer, 2007).

The on top of report, together with Gadamer’s earlier observation in his ‘Foreword to the second edition’ of Truth and Method that ‘Being that can be understood is language’, (Gaddamer, 1979) leaves us in no doubt about the fundamental position which language occupies within all realms of understanding and intelligibility and of its integral place within the hermeneutical enquiry. Understanding what a person articulate, in Gadamer’s view, is ‘to agree about the object, not to get inside another person and relive his experiences’, (Gadamer, 1979) and furthermore, he confirms that the process of understanding is linguistic in nature. However, being mindful of the provocative nature of this assertion, Gadamer argues that despite the perception that meaning can be conveyed without resorting to language, as in the instance of ‘silent consent’ or, as he states ‘guessing that something is the case without putting it into words’, these phenomena in fact constitute ‘modes of language’, Linguisticality (Iser, 1972).

Furthermore, his assertion that ‘the example of “silent agreement” is not so much an objection to the linguistic character of understanding; instead, it is the linguistic character of understanding that assures its breadth and universality’, (Gadamer, 2007) indicates that our understanding, whether or not expressed linguistically, is intrinsically linked to language, as the site of our expressive intelligibility. Gadamer claims that all our efforts to understand begin when confronted by ‘something that is strange, challenging, disorienting’, (Gadamer, 2007) in other words, when we are challenged by a phenomenon which we have not previously encountered. He traces the
origin of this way of thinking back to the ancient Greeks and to their notion of atopon which, he states, translates as ‘the placeless’ and denotes ‘that which cannot be fitted into the categories of expectation in our understanding and which therefore causes us to be suspicious of it’. Gadamer deduces from the Greeks is that our capacity to understand is related to our pre-given knowledge and awareness of a subject, which can be seen to concur with Heidegger’s theory of ‘fore-understanding’ and Gadamer’s notion of prejudice. This is not to suggest that we approach a given matter in a state of narrow-mindedness but rather that we are more open to discovery, by which is meant, we are pre-disposed to the acquisition of knowledge.

Having advanced the theory of the linguistic character of understanding, Gadamer saw the need for it to be rescued from the dominance of the technological world and reinstated as the means of facilitating all understanding. As he views it, the notion of the inseparability of language and understanding has been assumed by the rise of science in the seventeenth century, wherein the concept of method is deemed to be the ‘absolute starting point for our self-understanding’ (Gadamer, 2007). It is in Immanuel Kant thinking that Gadamer finds the means of reconciling the scientific reliance on experience with the all-encompassing concepts of metaphysics.

Kant champions the autonomy of reason and as Gadamer states, he shows ‘that without assuming freedom of the practical reason of man, the moral and social existence of man could not be thought’ (Gadamer, 2007). Kant’s thinking which clearly indicates the restraints that scientific method can place upon our thought process, amounts to an injunction for us to think outside the box. In recognizing the legitimacy of scientific language, Gadamer does not deny the value of the advancements that scientific progress has made in contributing to knowledge, however, whilst asserting that he is not a fatalist, he doubts the ability of science to place limitations on itself but sees rather that it is incumbent on humankind, by utilizing the political capacity that is within its reach to avoid the potentially destructive effects that may arise from technological scientific advancement. In making the observation that despite being absorbed by modern science he states that:

Language holds the invariable things in our nature fast, those things which come to be spoken of in language again and again. And the language of philosophy, as long as it remains language, will remain in a dialogue with that language of our world (Gadamer, 1976).

Gadamer took more optimistic view of the future prospects for language. Moreover, on the occasions when language deserts us, he claims that this is itself a form of language and not a meta-language. However, it could be argued that our failure in certain instances to access appropriate language does not always reflect our lack of facility with words but can, in some cases, be attributed to the inadequacy of spoken language. On the other hand, rather than seeing this as an end to speaking, for Gadamer, he recognized the dynamic properties of language, stating that ‘new linguistic structures and ways of expression arise from the changes in our lives and our experience’ (Gadamer, 2007), it is in fact a beginning.

In his discussion concerning the language of art, Gadamer accepts that art, in its various forms, is not always linguistic in nature. However, by arguing that every interpretation that furthers understanding has ‘the character of language’, he deduces that ‘the entire experience of the world is linguistically mediated’ (Iser, 1972). And, even if it is not itself linguistic, the work of art speaks and in identifying the special way in which it addresses us, he explains that ‘it speaks to the self-understanding of every person, and it does this as something ever present and by means of its own contemporaneousness’ (Gadamer, 1976).

The Unthought and Unspoken

According to Heidegger, he challenges us to consider the value of the unthought and unspoken aspects of a thinker’s work, by stating that:

The greater the work of a thinker which in no way coincides with the breadth and number of writings the richer is what is unthought in this work, which means, that which emerges in and through this work as having not yet been thought (Heidegger, 1991).

It is Gadamer, who thought through what is unthought in Heidegger most extensively, although not polemically, especially when it comes to the nature of ‘image’, ‘truth’, and ‘word’ and the inextricable link between them. Furthermore, Gadamer finds much of what Heidegger was striving for already contained within the tradition of
Platonic thought, namely, within one of the richest and most nuanced epochs of metaphysics (Gadamer, 2007). Where Heidegger sees the beginning of metaphysical thinking with the rise of calculative and clarificatory thought which he attributes to Plato and Aristotle, as a necessary falling away from something more original, as Gadamer sees it.

In Gadamer’s view, ‘Plato employs the concept of mimesis in order to emphasize the ontological distance between the original and the image’ (Gadamer, 1986) and whilst understanding the thinking that regards the visual arts as a form of imagery, in that they capture movement and render it immobile, he is not sympathetic to Plato’s so-called vilification of the status of art, which he particularly applies to the poetic arts, however, what he takes from Plato is the description of the beautiful as that which ‘shines forth’. In his defence of the authenticity of the image in ‘The Relevance of the Beautiful’, Gadamer, displaying the influence of Aristotle (Gadamer, 1960), takes an interesting approach by underlining the importance of recognition in our encounter with the beautiful. As he sees it, the function of the beautiful is to bridge the gap between the ideal and the real and to assert its universality in the particular.

In Gadamer’s view, the arts in their entirety reflect ‘the metaphysical heritage of our Western tradition. And the human science stands in a particularly close and interactive relationship with receptivity and sensitivity to art’ (Gadamer, 1960). Therefore, he believes, they are endowed with ‘a philosophical authenticity of their own’. However, he makes it clear that his enquiry is not solely concerned with justifying the truth of art, but is rather an attempt to develop ‘a concept of knowledge and of truth which corresponds to the whole of our hermeneutics experience’ (Gadamer, 1960). In other words, the hermeneutical enquiry, in which Gadamer attempts to evade the constraints of scientific methodology, is concerned with understanding the truth of all our relationships to the world.

Moreover, in Gadamer’s view, what he terms ‘aesthetic consciousness’ feeds into the dominance of science and, following Heidegger, he maintains that the resultant subjectivity of the aesthetic approach to the artwork inhibits our understanding of art’s claim to truth and with this thought he was prompted to start his enquiry in Truth and Method (1960) with a critique of aesthetic consciousness. However, as Gadamer argues in his later writings, by 1934 his critique of ‘aesthetic consciousness’ had already begun and, although Heidegger may have made his view of aesthetics known, this was prior to the publication of his seminal essay on the work of art wherein with his rejection of aesthetics he seeks to offer an alternative approach to understanding art in terms of work, truth, and Being.

**Aesthetics and Consciousness**

Gadamer argues that the modern concept of subjectivity, which is a legacy of the Kantian treatment of aesthetics, has robbed us of ‘effective historical consciousness’, by which he meant that we are deprived of awareness of the historical traditions of not only the Western world, but of other diverse historical cultures. Moreover, without the understanding which is an aspect of historical consciousness, we lack a necessary discernment hence we approach things with a naïve unquestioning acceptance. However, by further qualifying that ‘Being historical means never being able to pull everything out of an event such that everything that has happened lies before me’ (Gadamer, 1994), Gadamer confirms that historical consciousness is always incomplete.

In identifying the dangers of the subjectivity of aesthetic consciousness, Grondin is of the view that by considering works of art solely as aesthetic objects, they are deprived of their moral and cognitive overtones and ignoring the moral and cognitive dimensions has led to the rise of the autonomy of art in modernism (Gondin, 2003). The problem that arises in this situation is that in being autonomous the artwork, by definition, is set-apart and isolated and this isolation could be seen to jeopardize its role in enabling the emergence of truth. However, given that the notion of autonomy is synonymous with freedom, which can be equated with the concept of the absolute, and taking Gadamer’s understanding of the term ‘absolute’ to mean ‘independence from all restrictive conditioning’ (Harrier, 2009) it follows that within the context of modern art, its autonomy can be understood as self-containment, which frees it from inhibitions and grants it liberty to be true and to allow its truth to emerge. Art’s claim to absoluteness was recognized by Hegel, who attributed to it the capacity to transcend historical differences between eras.

However, Gadamer acknowledges the difficulties that we encounter in attempting to understand the experimental aspects of modern art and rather than indulging in a reactionary response to this new phenomenon in artwork, he suggests that an enquiry into fundamental human experiences could provide an answer. To this end, he states his
intention to enquire into ‘the anthropological basis of our experience of art’, by means of examining ‘the concepts of play, symbol, and festival’ (Gadamer, 1986).

In studying these basic phenomena of human existence, which he introduced in Truth and Method, Gadamer seeks a deeper understanding of the modes of human expression than traditional thinking can provide, one whereby art is viewed as a dynamic, historical, event in which, rather than being mere spectators, we are in fact participants. By including art within the broader realm of human experience and expression through his analysis of play, symbol, and festival and thereby illustrating the way that we engage with diverse artistic endeavors, Gadamer develops a more incisive understanding of its relevance within historically effected human experience than can be found in Heidegger (Gadamer, 2004). And, whilst remaining with the notion of *alētheia* in relation to the revelation of truth in art, which he inherited from Heidegger, Gadamer succeeds in highlighting the inclusiveness of the experience of art, thereby making it more accessible to our understanding.

Notwithstanding Gadamer’s disparaging view of aesthetic consciousness and the subjectivism found therein, Grondin identifies what can be perceived as a further divergence from Heidegger in, as he describes it, Gadamer’s ‘duel approach’ to the question of aesthetics, whereby although he perceives;

Aesthetic consciousness as a hollow and disastrous modern abstraction his entire project follows the lead of something like the aesthetic experience of truth when it undertakes to liberate the meaning of understanding and truth, as it is lived for instance in the human sciences and in our everyday practical judgments, from the straitjacket of the scientific, methodical model of truth (Gondin, 2003).

Grondin’s reading of Gadamer, in this instance, indicates a seemingly paradoxical treatment of the question of truth (Gondrin, 1998). Furthermore, in contrast to Heidegger, whose stated intention is the overcoming of metaphysics, Grondin’s findings show Gadamer’s willingness to work from within metaphysics, whilst still intent on grounding the notion of truth. And, rather than viewing metaphysics as an obstacle to his enquiry, Dennis Schmidt suggests that Gadamer sees it as a way to ‘open up the possibility of a different understanding and hence idiom of truth one which is not defined by the conceptual prejudices that define the sense of truth in the natural sciences and in metaphysics’ (Schmidt, 2011). In so doing, he believes that Gadamer goes ‘further toward opening a different future for philosophy than Heidegger did’. In a development of this argument, Schmidt draws attention to Kant’s treatment of the beautiful as a feeling of life, which he connects to the language of truth and its enactment.

Furthermore, in a move away from aesthetic consciousness, Gadamer indicates the direction of his investigation, stating that it is neither the role of the creator of the artwork nor of the participator that interests him, but rather, what he terms, ‘the mode of being’ of the artwork and its implications by clarifying that;

It is not the aesthetic consciousness, but the experience of art and thus the question of the mode of being of the work of art that must form the object of our examination, the work of art has its true being in the fact that it becomes an experience changing the person experiencing it (Gadamer, 1979).

He further explains that the subject of the work of art is not the subjectivity of the person who experiences it, but the work itself, and this is the point at which the mode of being of play becomes significant. Therefore, by exploring our innate disposition towards the concept of play and the phenomenon of our historical participation in the event of play, it will be shown how Gadamer reveals its intrinsic role in shaping our understanding of the other and simultaneously our self-understanding.

**The Significance of Play in Art**

Play as a participatory construction is central to Gadamer’s account of hermeneutics and the ontology and phenomenology of art. In his analyses of play in general Gadamer emphasizes the active engagement of the viewers (Gadamer, 2007). That is, not only do the players play the game but also the observers actively participate in the movement or life of the game. Similarly, in the play of art, the viewer engages in a back-and-forth interplay with the work which in the case of art allows the work to emerge in a communicative event. Artwork draws the viewer into its movement and expects a counter movement or response.
Furthermore, it illustrates that ‘the play of art’, according to Gadamer’s, indicate a view from outside whereby, in enabling us to reflect on aspects of our being that have heretofore eluded it enhances our capacity for self-understanding (Heidgger, 1991). Gadamer introduced the concept of play to his discussion on art at an early stage in his writing from which throughout his entire work it continues to be of significant within his hermeneutical enquiry. He explains that the reason for introducing the concept of play was precisely to show that everyone involved in play is a participant (Gadamer, 2004) and he further describes play as an elementary phenomenon that pervades the whole of the animal world…it determines man as a natural being (Gadamer, 2004). However, he looks for the distinguishing feature, within the context of play, which isolates man from other animals and he finds in the imposition of rules and regulations to the activity of play a characteristic which is peculiar to man.

Moreover, our consciousness of the inherent structure of play suggests that we possess an awareness which is not available to any other species, and the single-minded approach we take to abiding by rules is a phenomenon which, Gadamer states, is referred to by philosophers as ‘the intentionality of consciousness’ and is a distinctive characteristic of human behavior. Gadamer alerts us to the importance of the event of play, by stating that ‘failure to recognize the universal scope and ontological dignity of play produces an abstraction that blinds us to the interdependence of both’ (Palmer, 2007), which means that our lack of perception distorts our understanding of play, thereby causing a criticism of the whole notion of play and a trivialization of its importance within the context of human existence. Furthermore, the modern phenomenon of placing the act of play in the service of the interests of large commercial enterprises raises a further challenge to our understanding of play, wherein its integrity and freedom is compromised and its identity as play is brought into question.

Gadamer draws an analogy between the structure of play and the rules that determine and bind our lives together and permeate all facets of human activity, including ritual, the administration of justice, and social behavior in general, with the added observation that a certain self-imposed limitation of our freedom seems to belong to the very structure of culture (Gadamer, 2004). ‘The limitation of freedom’, which Gadamer refers to here, and which can also be understood in terms of the responsibility of freedom, is evident in the ethical and social patterns that shape our lives and which are essential in ensuring any form of harmonious existence. Moreover, in Gadamer’s view, any attempt to examine the differences between animal behaviors, which can be seen as a response to instinct as opposed to human behavior he suggests, ‘everything follows from a freely made decision’, (Gadamer, 2004) can only be approached indirectly. Therefore, prompted by his observation that art has been traditionally viewed within the context of play, he suggests that an appropriate medium for such an enquiry can be found within the realm of art and he starts his enquiry by examining the connection between play and the work of art.

However, Gadamer clearly does not support what could be seen as a deprecation of the position of art, but views it rather as an integral aspect of our existence, which he attempts to understand by linking it to the experience of play. And by making the connection between art and play, he shows the fundamental relevance of art within the context of our lives, maintaining that ‘persistence on the opposition between life and art is tied to the experience of an alienated world’ (Gadamer, 1986), and with this alienation the true value of art, its enactment of truth, is missed by the tradition.

Whilst acknowledging that the tendency to make the link between the experience of art and the concept of play can be traced back to Immanuel Kant, Gadamer makes it clear that he does not subscribe to the subjective view of the alliance of art and play, shared by Kant and Schiller, which has been perpetuated by tradition. Following Kant and Schiller the traditional experience of art is missing ‘the play like character of the creation wherein the very fact of its being played, comes to the fore. George picks up on Gadamer’s use of the term ‘creation’ in his later essay ‘The Play of Art’ (1977), and perceives it as an attempt to align art with creation precisely in order to distance art from the idea of work’. However, it should be noted that in an earlier essay ‘The Relevance of the Beautiful’ (1974), (Gadamer, 2004) Gadamer made a suggestion that, in the interest of avoiding any misapprehension concerning the status of art, ‘we should replace the word “work” by the word “creation”. At the same time as there may be some degree of substance to George’s critique of Gadamer’s choice of phrase with reference to art, bearing in mind that, within ‘The Play of Art’, he does argue that because of the uniqueness of a work of art it could more accurately be called ‘a creation’ than a work, also stating that the various art forms which rely upon reproduction ‘must constantly be reconstituted as a creation’, (Gadamer, 2004) throughout his later writing, Gadamer continues to use the term ‘work’, being-at-work, with reference to art.

Moreover, he distinguishes the work produced by the craftsman, which is made to fulfill a useful function, from the artist’s production, which is only there to be contemplated, claiming that in being exhibited the artwork is a ‘work’
and, ‘it remains a work by the artist, which, as a work by the artist, can be signed’ (Gadamer, 1986). Bearing in mind Ingrid Scheibler’s observation that in the case of ‘a subjectivized aesthetics, both the work of art and aesthetic experience depend on a process of alienation’, Gadamer’s narrow definition of art, which effectively isolates it from the community, appears to reintroduce some subjectivity into his discussion.

Furthermore, he expounds on this to include the works ‘of a creative instant’ that impact on us and leave a lasting impression, including not only the plastic arts, but also music and poetry and he clarifies that these forms of art also go through what is linguistically described as passing from poiesis (producing) to poiein (a thing made)’. However, in his discussion concerning the notion of play, wherein it is established that we are not the subject of play, but rather are participants in the event of play, (Gadamer, 1986), Gadamer makes it clear that the notion of subjectivity, which is aligned to the traditional aesthetic appreciation of art, is contrary to his way of thinking.

In his essay ‘The Relevance of the Beautiful’, subtitled ‘Art as Play, Symbol, and Festival’, Gadamer gives an account of art’s connection to each of these three phenomena and, mindful of Plato’s theory of the one and the many, he draws attention to their common role wherein they are united in establishing our relationship to the work of art. Closely allied to the concept of play which has already been explored within this work is the concept of the symbol, which Gadamer introduces to the discussion within the context of understanding modern art. He points out that, unlike classical art, modern art does not guide in the experience of perceiving beauty in nature, on the contrary, it is, he states, ‘precisely indeterminacy of reference that addresses us in modern art and that compels us to be fully conscious of the significance of the exemplary meaning of what we see before us’ (Gadamer, 1986).

The fulfillment of this search for wholeness which amounts to finding ‘our other half’ is, as Gadamer argues that it is found in the experience of love and furthermore, this search is also a facet of our relationship to the beautiful in art, which does not provide immediate understanding, but is rather imbued with a promise of further discovery (Gadamer, 1986). Gadamer claims that ‘the symbolic in general, and especially the symbolic in art, rests upon an intricate interplay of showing and concealing’, (Gadamer, 1986), which he considers to be particularly relevant in furthering our understanding of contemporary art, in allowing its meaning to emerge, and thereby in enhancing our self-understanding. As Gadamer explains:

Self-understanding takes place in relation to something else that is understood and includes the unity and sameness of this other. Inasmuch as we encounter the work of art in the world and a world in the individual work of art, this does not remain a strange universe into which we are magically transported for a time. Rather, we learn to understand ourselves in it, and that means that we preserve the discontinuity of the experience in the continuity of our existence’ (Gadamer, 2004).

According to Gadamer, he highlights the continuing relevance of the truth which we experience and come to know through the work of art and he cautions against the tendency to immediacy, which is a feature of aesthetic awareness, and reminds that ‘art is knowledge and the experience of the work of art is a sharing of this knowledge’.

The third phenomenon that Gadamer isolates is the concept of the festival, which he describes as ‘the inclusive concept for regaining the idea of universal communication’ (Risser, 2012), and with this in mind it is the shared aspect of the festival that is of prime importance for Gadamer. A festival, he states, ‘is meant for everyone’ (Gondin, 2003) it takes the form of a communal event in which people are united in a shared celebration and although it is a universal experience, it can be related to and understood in terms of one’s own cultural milieu.

However, at the same time suggesting that the question of the temporal structure of the festival could provide a way to our understanding of ‘the festival character of art and the temporal structure of the work of art’ (Risser, 2012). Gadamer stresses that art needs to find its own place unrestrained by prevailing cultural perceptions. This claim has particular relevance in the case of contemporary art, which is distinguished by its lack of conformity to the traditional expectations. Furthermore, Gadamer’s view of the temporal aspect of art indicates a departure from Heidegger’s notion of our encounter with the work of art, which he views as a singular event. His inquiry into the temporal structure of a festival, what precisely constitutes a festival and the festive character of a festival leads Gadamer to conclude that, regardless of the solemnity or the joyfulfulness of the occasion:

A festive occasion is always something uplifting which raises the participants out of their everyday existence and elevates them into a kind of universal communion. Consequently, the festive occasion possesses its own sort of temporality (Risser, 2012).
It can be seen by this that the temporal structure of a festival has a uniqueness, which challenges us to adapt ourselves to a different management of time from that which we experience within the daily routine, thereby offering a form of escapism from the vicissitudes of life and removal from a consciousness of the perceived pressure of time. Gadamer makes an analogy between our obliviousness of the movement of time in the case of the festival and the way we take time to dwell upon and tarry with the work of art, thereby bringing time to a standstill.

Further enquiry into understanding of the term ‘art’, Gadamer returns to antiquity and he situates art within the realm of Aristotle’s notion of ‘poietike episteme, the knowledge and facility appropriate to production’ (Gadamer, 2004). This knowing is a necessary attribute of both the craftsman and the artist and, in Gadamer’s view, it is when the work of craftsman and the work of the artist becomes separated from the activity of production, that the distinction between theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge becomes evident.

Considering Plato’s assertion, Gadamer confronts the pertinent question which, he states, ‘is how to distinguish “art” from the mechanical arts within this general concept of productive knowledge’. His search for an answer leads him to the ancient Greeks, where he encounters the view that art is merely an imitation of nature and therefore lacking a ‘real’ identity of its own, which in turn raises further philosophical problems. Notwithstanding the ancients view of art as imitation and in an attempt to overcome the problems which this notion imposes upon the position of art, Gadamer turns his attention to the way that Aristotle views poetry which, for Gadamer, as for Heidegger, is considered to be the most eminent form of art.

The significance of the Beautiful within our Understanding of Art

As already mentioned, the ‘concept of the beautiful’, its being at work, is pivotal to Gadamer’s enquiry into the philosophical significance and truth of the artwork. Although since Plato the notion of the truth of the work of art had been destabilized, Gadamer returns to Plato to establish a connection between the concept of the beautiful and the concept of the true, which he finds in Plato’s dictum that alētheia is the essential element of the beautiful (Gadamer, 2004). In line with Heidegger, Gadamer applies the notion of alētheia to his search for the truth of art. As we have seen, Heidegger was the first thinker in modern times to retrieve and radicalize the notion of alētheia from ancient times, interpreting it to mean unconcealedness (Gadamer, 2004). However, by exploring the question of beauty from within the question of being, Heidegger does not place an emphasis on the beautiful in the way that Gadamer does, and whereas he does not deny the concept of the beautiful, what he decrives is the aesthetic approach to beauty that has been espoused by the metaphysical tradition leading to, as he sees it, a forgetfulness of being. However, in a further invocation of Plato and contrary to Heidegger’s contention that the forgetfulness of being and of the finitude of being begins with Plato, Gadamer claims that it is in the ‘tradition of Platonism that the conceptual vocabulary required for thought about the finiteness of human life was developed’ (Gadamer, 1986). Gadamer’s retrieval of Plato and Platonism was more nuanced and arguably richer reading of the metaphysical tradition, marked the very difference between Heidegger and Gadamer.

In continuing with his exploration of the concept of the beautiful, Gadamer reside with the ancient Greeks and having found in Plato not only affirmation of the link between the beautiful and the true that he is looking for, he finds a link to the concept of the good and even, as he states to the concept of arête, denoting virtue and excellence which in ancient Greece represented the ideal, the highest human attainment. He notes that the concept of the beautiful moves very close to that of the good insofar as it is something to be chosen for its own sake (Gadamer, 1986), therefore, as this shows, it is the unconditional aspect of each of these concepts that determines their closeness.

Furthermore, in drawing our attention to the natural human tendency toward imitation and the natural pleasure we all take in imitation he claims the joy we take in imitation is really the joy of recognition (Gadamer, 2007). For Aristotle when we recognize something we re-cognize it as something that we already have an awareness of. Therefore, by accepting Aristotle’s theory viewing art as mimetic does not deprive it of its autonomy nor does it represent an obstacle to the ontological status of the work of art.

This particular adaptation of Aristotle’s thinking meant reinterpreting Plato’s concept of mimesis in art appears to place Gadamer in a position similar to the one that previously aroused his own criticism of Aristotle, whereby he
was prompted to make the observation that ‘Aristotle often over-orch even mis-stated the positions of others in order to make his own argument clear. However, this is not to suggest that Gadamer was accusing Aristotle of misunderstanding Plato. What Gadamer took from Plato is his theory of the shining forth of the beautiful and by emphasizing that the beautiful should be understood in terms of an image that shines forth, he overcomes the negative connotations of mimesis, as he explains;

In the case of the beautiful it makes no sense to ask whether what appears in the image of the beautiful is the thing itself or a copy because the beautiful has the purely evidential character (das Einleuchtende) of what shines forth (Vorscheinen) (Gadamer, 2004).

Furthermore, by thus reinforcing the metaphysical quality of the beautiful, he additional distances it from the notion of mimesis, which promises well for his argument whereby he seeks to substantiate the artworks’ claim to truth by means of the concept of the beautiful. In the *Philebus*, Gadamer detects a change of emphasis, by Plato, noting that the importance of mimesis is superseded by the concept of the beautiful, the concept of truth and the concept of the good. In what appears to be an amalgamation of the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle the beautiful is seen to be an essential part of the concept of the good, which only permits of being grasped within the three-ness of beauty, symmetry, and truth (Gadamer, 2007).

Gadamer disagreed with Jaeger’s statement that Plato’s notion of measure is aligned to mathematical exactness and accuses him of missing the point completely which is, as Gadamer argues, that ‘the exact itself has to do with doing the appropriate, the fitting and the needful at the favorable moment (Gadamer, 1977). In what could be viewed as an attempt to bring Plato and Aristotle together, Gadamer’s reading of Plato took it to mean that the measure represents the median between opposites, which indicates a seemingly uncharacteristic move away from the mathematicality by Plato, who has been deemed, by Aristotle, to be a Pythagorean. However, whilst Gadamer concedes that Plato does appear as more a meta-mathematician than as a metaphysician (Gadamer, 1960), he claims that this does not represent a conflict with the Greek way of thinking. Furthermore, merging the metaphysical view with the empirical could, protect art from the suggestion of imitation, even as still allowing the rules of the mean to apply. In the midst of this positive assertion, in which Gadamer reaffirms the transfigurative claim that art makes on us, Gadamer establishes a place for art, which takes it beyond Hegel, who questions the continuing hierarchy of art in its role of enabling the disclosure of truth.

**Modernity and independence: The original Artist**

In a brief assessment of the place of art within Western culture throughout the ages and up to contemporary times Gadamer construct the observation that art was not singled out for any special recognition in either ancient times nor in the Christian Middle Ages (Gadamer, 1960). He explains that the reason for this lies is the unquestioning acceptance by which art found its place in life, by which he meant that it was adapted by the traditions of the day in both its visual and linguistic forms. Art was used as a medium for the propagation of the Christian message, through iconic stylized images and ornate volumes of scripture and through the literary arts it represented the myths and sagas of antiquity in ever new ways. However, at the same time as enshrined in the historical and timeless aspect of art, these new ways often included disparate views and as Gadamer noted, they gave rise to discord between poets and philosophers each in their own ways seeking the truth (Gadamer, 1960). The Middle-Ages heralded turbulent times for art, when the authenticity of word and image was called into question and internal tensions gave rise to iconoclastic acts and as Gadamer perceives it change only came with the advent of modernity and autonomy which set the stage for the emergence of the creative artist.

Through the rebirth of humanism in the Renaissance came a new recognition for the accomplishments of human art and culture, together with a revival of the original classical works of the Greek and Latin authors. And since, as Grondin reminds us, ‘the Renaissance was a rebirth of antiquity, one could trace back the seeds of humanism to Greek remains itself and more specifically to Socrates and his concentration on merely human affairs (Grondin, 2003). The focus on human achievement in the Renaissance, the creative artist was ranked alongside the creator, God, viewed as another kind of God. However, rather than interpreting this to mean an assault on the divinity of God, humanism, as can often be perceived is not synonymous with atheism but can rather be understood as an endorsement of the human position as well as an acknowledgment of the divine which had predominated in the Middle-Ages. In line with the concept of creation, it can be taken as a manifestation of the omnipotence of the divine creator.
In the age of Enlightenment Grondin identifies a second form of humanism emerged through the works of ‘Lessing, Schiller, Goethe, and Winckelmann, all of whom followed the Renaissance in viewing man as a being whose constant task can only consist in perfecting his own self’ (Gondin, 2003). It was the age when Immanuel Kant delivered his famous dictum, ‘sapere aude’ and the autonomy of the human being was gaining prominence and it was, according to Gadamer, the age when art achieved its highest rank (Gadamer, 2007). Following Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, who coined the word aesthetics, Kant moved aesthetics to the centre of philosophical debate. However, Gadamer credits Hegel’s lectures on aesthetics and their development by the art historian Heinrich Gustav Hotho, with exerting the greatest influence on art up until the twentieth-century, at which stage, he states, ‘aesthetics no longer dealt with the beautiful but with art’ (Gadamer, 2007).

The effects of the Enlightenment were not only felt in the realms of art, but also in the area of science, with the liberation of thought which finally permitted an acceptance of new discoveries. As Gadamer observes, western culture moved away from the closed, geocentric image of the world and the Copernican turn caused unimaginable infinities to open up, this sparked new directions for scientific investigation (Gadamer, 2007). With the advances in science and technology, knowledge and inventiveness combined to assist in the attempts by humans to conquer the world and to subjugate nature. Science continues to pursue the quest to overcome the challenges of nature, in diverse areas such as genetic engineering or space exploration. This shift in emphasis from religion to science following the Enlightenment was felt throughout the arts which were no longer employed in the service of the propagation of religious beliefs.

In place of this it was, Gadamer who stated that, the experience of order which art in all its forms, particularly music, came to represent for a more elitist society, thereby effectively isolating art and fostering an aesthetic appreciation of works of art. As science and scientific method continue to dominate and replace the metaphysical concepts of olden days, Gadamer declared that ‘aesthetics in the form of the philosophy of art took over the place that had formerly been held by cosmology and philosophy of nature in the realm of classical metaphysics and with the support of aesthetics the philosophy of art attained a new higher rank. The traditional acceptance of the subjective aesthetic approach to the question of art in the twentieth century with its resultant alienating effect represents a challenge which is confronted by Heidegger and Gadamer, within their separate critiques of aesthetics and the aesthetic consciousness.

A third form of humanism emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century, with a renewed reverence for the ancient Greek and Latin classical works, a study of which provided what was considered to be a truly humanistic education (Gondrin, 1998). However, as history records, the violence which occurred in Germany during the Second World War placed the concept of humanism into question and led to serious debate not only in philosophical circles concerning our possibilities for recovery from such a massive violation of human dignity. The shock waves of the time brought a global response and a renewed awareness of the question of humanism (Gondrin, 1998).

According to Grondin he made the claim that the issue of humanism could enable us to understand what is profoundly at stake and strikingly different in the philosophies of Heidegger and Gadamer adding that, Gadamer was a humanist and Heidegger isn’t (Gondrin, 1998). Moreover, he claimed that on the issue of humanism Gadamer took a step or leap beyond Heidegger (Gondrin, 1998). However, this dissertation would like to argue with this claim on two counts. First, the implication here is that by not subscribing to the traditional understanding of humanism, one is left behind and lacking in concern for humanity. However, in his ‘Letter on Humanism’, Heidegger refutes this notion and makes it clear that although he does not espouse the traditional conception of humanism, he does not condone inhumane acts, further explaining that humanism is opposed because it does not set the humanitas of the human being high enough (Weinsheimer, 1985). Second, by warning us of the folly of attempting to ‘be “against” Heidegger or even “for” him’, adding that ‘one cannot circumvent thinking so easily’(Gadamer, 1994) Gadamer made it quite clear that one’s thinking cannot be measured against Heidegger whereas there are clearly differences in the individual approaches by Heidegger and Gadamer to the question of humanism, this cannot be seen as measure of one’s achievement over the other.
Conclusion

This article has attempted to analyze and support the importance of Gadamer’s unique contribution to the philosophical debate concerning the fundamental question of truth in the event of the encountering with the work of art. It have shown that, whilst following Heidegger’s thinking in certain areas and always mindful of his intellectual debt to Heidegger, by engaging with Plato, Gadamer succeeds in developing a distinctive philosophical hermeneutics of the humanities, from within a metaphysical register, in a way that Heidegger, who was intent on overcoming or recovering from metaphysics was unable to do. Apart from the ancient Greeks, it has been shown that together with Heidegger, the other major influence on Gadamer’s thinking came from Hegel, although Gadamer made the point that the notion of conversation and dialogue, which was central to his hermeneutics, differs entirely from Hegel’s dialectic. In his first significant publication *Truth and Method* which is concerned with the problem of the hermeneutics of universality Gadamer, began with a discussion on the question of truth as it emerged in the experience of art. He attributed the philosophical importance of art to the unique way that it allows truth and untruth to be revealed and concealed which in his view presented the most pressing challenge to the scientific consciousness to acknowledge its own limits. Gadamer was mindful of the limitations of natural science in acknowledging the truth of the human sciences which was unverifiable by scientific method, in its search for intensive rather than extensive clarity.

However, by pointing out that interpreting and understanding are not exclusive to the sciences, Gadamer indicates the universal structures of his hermeneutical investigation which he admits to basing on ‘finitude’ and ‘the historical character of Dasein’. Moreover, although he brought out the playful aspect of art, he rejected the subjective aesthetic approach to art which only served to distort our understanding of the artwork’s role in enabling the emergence of truth. In what was to be attributed to the influence of Heidegger, he adopted the Greek notion of *aithētia*, denoting disclosure as a means of understanding the intensified increase in being through the disclosure of truth in art. However, whilst his notion of truth was unmistakably Heideggerian, Gadamer’s philosophy, which is based on the commonality and solidarity of the hermeneutics experience, is dialogical in ways that Heidegger’s is not. The question of language, which is the cornerstone of philosophy, is central to Gadamer’s hermeneutics and has been given an account of the way that Gadamer illuminates the importance of language’s intrinsic role in facilitating understanding, thereby leading to self-understanding. It has been shown how, by re-engaging with the Greeks in rehabilitating a dialogical method of hermeneutics reading and interacting with the world. Furthermore, it has drawn attention to Gadamer’s response to the constraints which the rise of scientific method imposes upon the role of language, whereby he appeals to Kant whose enjoinder dare to think lead towards a certain enacted freedom of thought and a means of reconciling the empirical with the rational.

Reference